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De-Democratizing Criminal Law
Benjamin Levin*
Writing twenty years ago, the late Harvard Law professor William Stuntz diagnosed a set of
“pathological politics” at the heart of U.S. criminal law.1 Stuntz sought to explain why carceral policies
in the United States appeared to operate as a one-way ratchet, constantly expanding the scope of
criminal law and the severity of its punishments. Stuntz’s article on The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law – one of the most heavily cited in contemporary criminal law scholarship – ultimately offered an
argument grounded in political economy. The story of overcriminalization and mass incarceration
was a story of electoral politics, of whiter and wealthier suburban voters favoring harsh responses to
social problems and using criminal law to police poorer people of color in U.S. cities, and of the
incentives created for judges, legislators, and prosecutors to punish more.2
Over the past two decades, some version of the pathological politics thesis has become a common
refrain in criminal law scholarship. Certainly, scholars continue to debate the doctrinal nuances of
substantive criminal law and constitutional criminal procedure. But, a growing body of literature
produced by U.S. legal academics focuses instead on the politics, structures, and institutions that define
the administration of criminal law.3 At the same time, the carceral state and the institutions of mass
incarceration have come under increasing fire. With the publication of The New Jim Crow,4 the rise of
the Movement for Black Lives, and increasing bipartisan attention to the long hangover of decades of
tough-on-crime policies, the moment of “criminal justice reform” has arrived.5
Where only a short time ago Democrats and Republicans sparred for the mantle of toughest on
crime, politicians increasingly adopt the language of mass incarceration, decrying racial disparities and
endorsing non-carceral alternatives.6 Indeed, the last few years have even seen a groundswell in
support for District Attorney candidates with defense backgrounds who have run on platforms
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1 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 M ICH . L. R EV . 505 (2001).
2 See generally id.
3 And, it is worth noting that comparative accounts of criminal policy frequently focus on the role of elections and electoral
politics as a driver of the exceptional brutality and scope of the U.S. carceral state. See, e.g., DARRYL K. BROWN , FREE
MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE : HOW DEMOCRACY AND LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW (2015);
NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND P UNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRACIES (2008); JAMES Q. WHITMAN , HARSH J USTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
4 M ICHELLE A LEXANDER , T HE N EW J IM CROW : M ASS INCARCERATION IN THE A GE OF C OLORBLINDNESS (2010).
5 See generally Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 M ICH . L. R EV . 259 (2018).
6 See generally Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 M ICH . L. R EV . 259 (2018) (collecting
sources).
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devoted to dismantling or at least dialing back the carceral state.7 In short, the politics of criminal law
appear to have reached a breaking point.8
In many ways, Rachel Barkow’s Prisoners of Politics: Breaking the Cycle of Mass Incarceration stands as
the culmination of the pathological politics thesis.9 Released into a moment of potential and
uncertainty in criminal justice policy, Barkow’s important book shows just how much criminal justice
thinking and structural criminal law scholarship has grown since the turn of the twenty-first century.
But, unlike Stuntz, and unlike a growing chorus of academics and advocates, Barkow argues that the
solution to the problem does not come via popular democracy; rather, the way to address the carceral
state’s pathological politics is to move away from (electoral) politics. To Barkow, the best path forward
is to embrace the bureaucratic aspects of the criminal system.
Through a series of compelling anecdotes backed with statistical and historical context, Barkow
explains how U.S. “penal populism” has fueled the carceral state. In response to these structural
issues, Barkow departs from Stuntz and a growing chorus of academics and advocates to ague not for
more or better democracy, but for a technocratic turn. In Barkow’s telling, the criminal system has
failed in large part because it has been constructed by non-experts who have not pursued rational or
evidence-driven solutions to problems of public safety.10 As advocates and academics celebrate the
rise of so-called progressive prosecutors, the increase in activism targeting punitive policies, and
legislative efforts to dial back criminal law, Barkow calls for a new politics rooted in expertise and
evidence-based decisionmaking.
This Review proceeds in two Parts. In Part I, I describe Barkow’s argument, situating it against
the backdrop of a growing schism between criminal justice “bureaucratizers” and “democratizers.”
In Part II, I argue that Barkow’s call for expertise raises important questions about the nature of
criminal justice policymaking, the purpose of the criminal system, and the limitations of expertise and
rationality as responses to deep structural critiques. Ultimately, I see Barkow’s account as an important
reminder of the punitive impulses at the heart of U.S. political culture and, as such, a timely and
cautionary tale for those enthusiastic about a democratic turn. But, I also remain skeptical about a
prioritization of “rationality” and a prioritization of experts dedicated to optimizing “public safety.”

See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO S T. J. CRIM. L. 647 (2017);
Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution”, 132 H ARV. L. REV. 748 (2018); Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Are Prosecutors the
Key to Justice Reform?, THE A TLANTIC , May 18, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/areprosecutors-the-key-to-justice-reform/483252/; Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019).
8 Of course it is worth noting that the politics of criminal law aren’t and never have been monolithic. See generally P HILIP
GOODMAN , JOSHUA PHILIPS , AND MICHELLE PHELPS, BREAKING THE PENDULUM : THE LONG STRUGGLE OVER
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2017). Indeed, scholars increasingly have argued that the “criminal justice system” is hardly a single
system and is better understood as conglomeration of local institutions embedded in local politics. See, e.g., Bernard E.
Harcourt, The Influence of Systems Analysis on Criminal Law and Procedure: A Critique of a Style of Judicial Decision-Making (Columbia
Public Law Research Paper No. 14-562, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3062900;
Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of “Criminal Justice”, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619 (2018); Sara Mayeux, The Idea of
“The Criminal Justice System”, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 55 (2018); John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by A Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic
Account of Prison Growth, 111 M ICH. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2013); Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of EvidenceBased Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 558 (2015) (“[T]he ‘system’ is not a system at all. Instead, it is a loose
affiliation among independent law enforcement agencies, individual counties, local jails, and state prisons.”).
9 R ACHEL ELISE B ARKOW , P RISONERS OF P OLITICS : B REAKING THE C YCLE OF M ASS INCARCERATION (2019).
10 See, e.g., id. at 10.
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I.

The Limits of Democracy

As critics of mass incarceration have internalized the pathological politics of the carceral state,
they generally have endorsed one of two broad approaches: an embrace of more (or better) democracy
and public participation, or a rejection of public participation in favor of expert decision-making.11
While both approaches are well represented in the literature, the democratizers generally appear
to have gained the upper hand in the debate.12 A democratic turn can take many forms and have many
different political valences: to Stuntz, the answer to the problem of pathological politics was a (re)turn
to the local.13 To law professor-turned judge Stephanos Bibas, the criminal system has become
unmoored from its roots as an institution of public morality because of its over-reliance on lawyers
and other bureaucratized elites.14 And, to a growing chorus of left, radical critics, the criminal system
operates as vehicle of social control; if power could be turned over to the people, the community, or
movement actors, the argument goes, the carceral state would wither and die to be replaced by nonpunitive institutions.15
It’s not that democratizers ignore or disregard the relationship between representative democracy
and mass incarceration. Indeed, scholars who don’t adopt a bureaucratic- or expert-driven model
generally argue that there is close relationship between U.S. electoral politics (from the election of
judges and prosecutors to public perceptions of crime) and the growth of the carceral state.16 But,
many commentators and advocates seek to subvert that historical relationship: the problem isn’t
democracy or public participation as such; rather, criminal law suffers from many of the same ailments
as other corners of U.S. democracy.
As political scientist Lisa Miller and legal scholar James Forman, Jr. have argued in different
contexts, voters aren’t necessarily punitive in a vacuum. Rather, when presented with a limited set of
political responses to violent crime, they will choose punitive measures, not because of an abiding
punitiveness, but because they want the state to do something, and in a neoliberal political economy,
criminal law is usually the only something available.17 In statistically challenging the “myth of mob rule,”
See, e.g., Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Criminal Justice Reform, B. C. L. REV. (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3391800&download=yes; John Rappaport, Some Doubts About
'Democratizing'
Criminal
Justice,
87
U.
CHI.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3418059
12 See generally John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. C HI . L. R EV . (forthcoming 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3418059 (describing this tension and the ascendency of
democratic solutions); Joshua Kleinfeld et al., White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U.L. REV. 1693 (2017).
13 See generally WILLIAM J. S TUNTZ , T HE C OLLAPSE OF A MERICAN C RIMINAL J USTICE (2011).
14 See generally S TEPHANOS B IBAS, T HE M ACHINERY OF CRIMINAL J USTICE (2012).
15 See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward A Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 405 (2018); Patrisse Cullors, Abolition
and Reparations: Histories of Resistance, Transformative Justice, and Accountability, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1684 (2019); Introduction,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1568 (2019); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 H ARV. L. REV . 1613 (2019);
Platform, M OVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://policy.m4bl.org/platform/; Dorothy E. Roberts, Democratizing
Criminal Law As an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV . 15977 (2017); Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in
Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM . L. REV. 249 (2019).
16 See, e.g., M ARIE G OTTSCHALK , C AUGHT : T HE P RISON S TATE AND THE L OCKDOWN OF A MERICAN P OLITICS (2014);
LISA L. MILLER, THE MYTH OF MOB RULE: VIOLENT CRIME & DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2016); AYA GRUBER , THE
FEMINIST WAR ON CRIME (forthcoming 2020) (describing radical feminist support for carceral policies); JAMES FORMAN,
JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017).
17 See L ISA L. M ILLER , T HE M YTH OF M OB R ULE : V IOLENT C RIME & D EMOCRATIC P OLITICS 204 (2016); JAMES
FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017). Cf. BERNARD E.
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Miller has argued that when presented with a full menu of policy options, voters might opt for social
services or, at the very least, less-punitive criminal responses, but that full menu is rarely available,
particularly for voters and communities lacking in political clout.18 Similarly, in looking at Black
support for punitive policies that disproportionately affected Black defendants, Forman has argued
that the support was the result of compromise: many Black activists in the 1960s and 1970s called for
a “Marshall Plan for the cities.”19 These activists were concerned about crime, but they were asking for
social services, not just more police and more prosecutions. As in so many areas, the state’s response
was to strengthen the carceral apparatus.20
Viewed through this frame, mass incarceration isn’t necessarily or exclusively a creation of
problematic political inputs (i.e., public preferences); rather, the problem is one of political outputs
(i.e., how policymakers and political elites translate those preferences into law).21 So, this frame allows
for continued enthusiasm for democracy and public participation, as long as we can design
movements, policies, and institutions to be truly democratic and to center voices and impulses often
excluded from the halls of political power.
Prisoners of Politics stands as a powerful response to that democratic impulse. While starting form
a similar premise as the democratizers (i.e., that the politics of criminal law are corrosive), Barkow
tacks in a very different direction. Barkow decries the “over-politicization of criminal law – and the
corresponding lack of rational deliberation it brings.”22 As she describes it, democratic reforms can
only do so much to escape from the vicious cycles of pathological politics: “Strong political and
psychological forces remain decidedly in favor of long sentences and an expansive criminal state –
even when doing so is best characterized as pathological. If reform is sought directly through the
political process, it will achieve only so much before running up against these political forces.”23 The
narrative that she weaves is one in which popular punitive impulses have led to the constant
metastization of the carceral state, as legislators vie to respond to voters’ fear of crime. And, the
touchstone in Barkow’s account in “public safety.”24 Barkow argues that decades of pathological
politics haven’t made the United States a safer country, but well-designed expert agencies could
succeed where voters and politicians have failed.25

HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 40–44 (2011).
(“Neoliberal penality facilitates passing new criminal statutes and wielding the penal sanction more liberally because that
is where government is necessary, that is where the state can legitimately act, that is the proper and competent sphere of
politics.”); NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA 17(2014).
18 See generally L ISA L. M ILLER , T HE M YTH OF M OB R ULE : V IOLENT C RIME & D EMOCRATIC P OLITICS (2016).
19 F ORMAN , supra note 16, at 12-13.
20 See id. See also J ONATHAN S IMON , G OVERNING T HROUGH C RIME : H OW THE WAR ON C RIME T RANSFORMED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); Elizabeth Hinton, Julilly Kohler-Hausmann, &
Vesla M. Weaver, Opinion, Did Blacks Really Endorse the 1994 Crime Bill?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2016, at A25 (“Policy
makers pointed to black support for greater punishment and surveillance, without recognizing accompanying demands to
redirect power and economic resources to low-income minority communities.”).
21 Or, as Barkow observes, “often other societal safeguards are absent or fail, thus leaving it to criminal justice institutions
to address the problems.” BARKOW, supra note 9, at 184.
22 B ARKOW , supra note 9, at 140.
23 Id. at 124.
24 See, e.g., id. at 167, 184.
25 See, e.g., id. at 10-16.

In building this argument, Barkow structures the book in three parts. The first part examines
“some of the most important criminal justice approaches that fail to promote public safety and lead
to unnecessary confinement, the misallocation of resources, and . . . a disproportionate impact on
poor and minority communities.”26 Elsewhere, Barkow has argued that “in criminal law, stories, not
data, drive the policy analysis.”27 And, while Prisoners of Politics relies largely on a meticulous
deployment of crime data and academic research, Barkow does make effective use of stories that
highlight the irrationality and tragic absurdity of the criminal system – from James Bower, the
terminally ill drug defendant with six months to live who was denied compassionate release because
“officials believed he could still engage in criminal activity despite suffering from prostate cancer,28 to
ten-year-old Cindy “who cannot have a birthday party at her house because her father is a registered
sex offender.”29 In a sort of argumentative jujitsu, then, Barkow makes her case for data instead of
emotionally resonant stories by deploying those same stories.
In this part, Barkow decries substantive criminal law as outrageously broad. Statutes reach conduct
that may be harmless or may have little in common with the misfeasance that legislators had in mind
(a common refrain in the literature on overcriminalization). And, by allowing for such broad
applications, criminal law does a terrible job categorizing. “Sex offense” or “felony” might conjure
up certain images in the public imaginations, but these classifications sweep in many people and much
conduct that hardly fits the vernacular definition, leading to harsh sentences and social stigma that
appear a poor fit for the actual offense.30 Further, this categorical sloppiness exacerbates the problem
of collateral consequences, as institutional actors are unable to make exceptions, instead applying
sweeping restrictions to wide swaths of people with criminal records.31
Additionally, Barkow brings together a wealth of criminological research to argue against
“senseless sentencing” practices that do more harm than good.32 She embraces a utilitarian approach
to punishment arguing that many long sentences can’t survive cost-benefit analysis and that the actual
conditions in prison do little to rehabilitate and are, instead, criminogenic themselves.33 Barkow argues
that a shift away from the rehabilitative ideal hasn’t benefited society: “[t]he tragic irony of our current
approach to warehousing individuals without programming is that it fails miserably as a matter of
public safety.”34 Further, “the skepticism about rehabilitation” that took hold in the 1960s has “had
another negative consequence for public safety aside from the lack of programming in prisons: we
stopped reevaluating people and policies over time.”35 Or, put differently, in Barkow’s account, the

Id. at 17.
Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law As Regulation, 8 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 316, 322 (2014).
28 B ARKOW , supra note 9, at 87.
29 Id. at 95.
30 See generally B ARKOW , supra note 9, at 19-37. Cf. Alice Ristroph, Farewell to the Felonry, 53 H ARV . C.R.-C.L. L. R EV . 563
(2018) (critiquing the continued reliance on the felony categorization).
31 See generally B ARKOW , supra note 9, at 88-102.
32 See id. at 39-55.
33 See id. at 39-72.
34 Id. at 67.
35 Id. at 73. For a critical take on the reemergence of rehabilitation, though, see generally Jessica M. Eaglin, Against
Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189 (2013).
26
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institutions of criminal punishment haven’t been subject to necessary, meaningful oversight or
reexamination; they – and their attendant carceral logics36 – have been treated as natural and inevitable.
The second part pivots to the politics and institutions that have driven these failed policies.
Barkow briefly provides as account that will be familiar to scholars of criminal law: how a crime spike
in the 1960s helped fuel a carceral turn that was exacerbated by a marked imbalance in interest group
politics (i.e., advocates for prosecutorial policies are ubiquitous, well-funded, and well-organized, while
criminal defendants – particularly poor defendants, defendants of color, and others from marginalized
communities – are not a lobbyist’s dream).37 Importantly, Barkow highlights “the limits of progress
under populism.”38 Even much-celebrated contemporary reform efforts often adopt narrow frames
or targets: “Almost all the reforms have been to reduce imprisonment for what political scientist Marie
Gottschalk calls the ‘non, non, nons – that is, the nonserious, nonviolent, non-sex related
offenders.’”39 And, as Barkow stresses, this problem is bipartisan. For example, despite making public
statements (and writing a much-heralded law review article)40 about the importance of criminal justice
reform, President Barack Obama adopted a “cautious” approach to reform.41
The problem, though, isn’t just this populist push from Goldwater onward, Barkow argues.
Rather, it’s that popular punitivism has met no meaningful institutional check and that, as an historical
matter, any such checks have diminished over time.42 Here, Barkow takes an originalist turn, looking
to the late eighteenth century and the system of checks and balances that were designed and envisioned
to present the sort of unrestrained state power that has dominated modern criminal law.43 Clemency
has not done the work that it might have (Barkow is and has been one of the leading voices for
improving the clemency process),44 and prosecutors and legislators have served as inter-branch allies
in the war on crime, acting in tandem to enhance the breadth and severity of criminal law.45 The
judiciary is not spared Barkow’s critical eye, as she catalogues the ways in which judges – often
disempowered by legislators’ decisions in a prosecutor-dominated regime – have failed to exercise
even the limited tools at their disposal.46
Finally, in the book’s third part, Barkow pivots to the prescriptive. Building on her past
scholarship, Barkow traces a way forward with a focus on “institutional checks to inject rationality
See, e.g., Lori Gruen on Prisons in MYISHA CHERRY, UNMUTED: CONVERSATIONS ON PREJUDICE , OPPRESSION , AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 24, 29 (2019); Sarah Lamblee, Transforming Carceral Logics: 10 Reasons to Dismantle the Prison Industrial Complex
Through Queer/Trans Analysis, in CAPTIVE GENDERS: TRANS EMBODIMENT AND THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
235 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat Smith eds., 2011); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV.
1, 18 (2019).
37 See generally B ARKOW , supra note 9, at 105-19.
38 See id. at 119.
39 Id. at 120.
40 Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 H ARV . L. R EV . 811 (2017).
41 Id. at 122.
42 See generally id. at 125-38.
43 See generally id. at 125-29.
44 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing
Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387, 425-41 (2017); Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State
and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1345-51 (2008); Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring Clemency:
The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and A Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2015).
45 See generally B ARKOW , supra note 9, at 126-32.
46 See id. at 132-35.
36

into the process.”47 Her goal here is to “describe[ ] a better institutional model for criminal justice
decision-making that insulates the worst self-destructive impulses of populism and injects rationality
in the system so that public safety is maximized at the lowest cost and on the best available evidence.”48
In doing so, Barkow rejects solutions to the problems of punitive populism that she sees as politically
impractical (e.g., moving away from elected judges and prosecutors) and instead offers a turn to
expertise.
As she has elsewhere,49 Barkow proposes an administrative model for prosecutorial oversight.
Recognizing that prosecutors are the dominant actors in the criminal system, Barkow argues that
constructing a workable system of oversight for prosecutors’ offices should be an essential component
of any reform agenda.50 While Barkow expresses cautious optimism about the new crop of DAs
running on reformist platforms, she raises concerns about actually assessing DA performance and also
the vicissitudes of political will. Not only might campaign promises give way to prosecution as usual,
but the current excitement about reformist DAs might be replaced by a tough-on-crime backlash: “the
whims of the electorate are no replacements for. . . structural changes.”51
And, like prosecutors, Barkow argues, judges could make many improvements with the powers
and doctrines they already have at their disposal.52 In order to break the hold of punitive populism,
Barkow contends, reformers must focus more on judicial selection and the politics and prosecutorial
backgrounds of those taking the bench.53
That said, the heart of the book’s third part (and, in a sense, the heart of Prisoners of Politics) really
is Barkow’s call for a move to overarching expert policymaking. No matter how much work is done
to improve prosecutors and judges, Barkow contends, the United States “need[s] another institutional
actor or actors with the relevant expertise and access to data and empirical information to coordinate
and oversee criminal justice policies. . . .”54 Barkow acknowledges that there are “two crucial premises
behind this idea”: (1) “criminal justice has to be more coordinated than it is now” because
“coordination is necessary to get better outcomes”; and (2) “empirically valuable information on
criminal law can lead to better decisions.”55 Where too many discussions of criminal policy and
criminal justice reform assume that we all agree on what “better” means, Barkow is careful to specify
her utilitarian priors: “better decisions” are “decisions that improve public safety and human lives at
a lower cost.”56
Id. at 140.
Id.
49 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 S TAN . L.
REV. 869 (2009).
50 See generally B ARKOW , supra note 9, at 143-54.
51 Id. at 164.
52 See generally id. at 186-98. Cf. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129
HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016) (making an analogous claim about the untapped potential of judges to improve the
administration of criminal law).
53 See generally B ARKOW , supra note 9, at 198-201. Cf. also Andrew Manuel Crespo, Regaining Perspective: Constitutional Criminal
Adjudication in the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1985, 1987 (2016) (tracking the relationship between Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and judges’ prosecutorial backgrounds).
54 B ARKOW , supra note 9, at 166.
55 Id. at 166-67.
56 Id. at 167. Certainly, as in any cost-benefit analysis, each term could be parsed endlessly, and the question of what facts
or factors to endogenize into the concepts of “public safety,” improved “human lives,” and “cost” remains a massive one.
47
48

Looking to her experiences as a commissioner on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Barkow offers
a set of best practices for structuring a criminal oversight agency or agency. Despite many
shortcomings in form and function, sentencing commissions in Barkow’s account have had some
important successes.57 She particularly praises the ways in which sentencing commissions have been
able to bring together different voices and interests to address a common problem.58 While she
concedes that the federal commission and its state analogs are not without their problems, Barkow
argues that many critiques actually rest on the ways in which the expert-led bodies have been
insufficiently insulated from politics as usual; as she puts it, the “Commission has rarely been left alone
to make policy and Congress has directed just about everything it has done over the years.”59 So,
looking to lessons from administrative law, Barkow walks through a range of different institutional
approaches to providing further independence.60 Further, Barkow argues that coordinated institutions
devoted to systemic oversight will be able to take a broader view and see the ways in which policies
interact and the ways in which the criminal system relates to other legal and social institutions.61
II.

The Limits of Bureaucracy

The prescriptive turn to agency oversight is much of what makes Prisoners of Politics such a
fascinating read and a novel contribution to the literature. But, that turn also raises questions about
the nature of both expertise and the carceral state. I am hardly the first person to express some
concern about a technocratic or bureaucratic approach to criminal policy making, but I see Barkow’s
account and a case for expert decisionmaking as raising three major questions: (1) Is criminal
policymaking suited to expert-based solutions? (2) What is criminal justice expertise? And (3) Can we
really divorce technocratic approaches from politics? In this Part, I address those questions in turn.62
A) Is Criminal Policymaking Suited to Expert-Based Solutions?
One of the peculiarities of the debate over bureaucratization of criminal law is the departure from
politics as usual. That is, in debates about criminal law and its administration, many of the same
commentators who usually embrace agency discretion and deference to experts suddenly balk. Or,
more pointedly, many commentators who usually embrace the administrative state and fall on the
political left when it comes to matters of regulation adopt a decidedly libertarian rhetoric when it
comes time to address state action in the criminal context.
This tension is evident in the debates around non-delegation and the Sex Offender Registry
Notification Act as well as in well-established criticism of courts’ approach to prison law and
regulation. For example, much commentary on civil prison litigation and the Prison Litigation Reform

Nevertheless, in an academic and policy space often full of bromides and light on details, where it’s easy to accept the
illusion of consensus because of lack of specifics, I think Barkow deserves credit for being forthright in her
consequentialism.
57 See generally id. at 171-75.
58 See id. at 174-75
59 Id. at 171.
60 See id. at 177-83.
61 See id. at 183-85.
62 And, elsewhere, I have begun to examine seminal issues with a specific eye to the role of judges in the criminal system.
See generally Benjamin Levin, Values and Assumptions in Criminal Adjudication, 129 HARV . L. REV . F. 379 (2016)

Act stresses the offensiveness of courts’ general deference to decisions made by prison management.63
Deferring to prison regulatory authorities is framed as a means of enabling abuse, rather than an
outgrowth of the New Deal social order.64 Judges excuse their failure to vindicate the rights of the
incarcerated by nodding to the expertise of prison officials.65 To those concerned about the brutal
conditions faced by people inside, this deference is an outrage. But, for believers in the administrative
state, why is deference to the Federal Bureau of Prisons inherently more objectionable than deference
to the Food and Drug Administration or any other regulatory authority?
Similarly, defense attorneys and advocates for the rights of people with sex offense convictions
have sought to challenge the Sex Offender Notice and Registration Act (SORNA) under the nondelegation doctrine, a dead-letter theory that has remained a hobby horse of libertarian critics of the
administrative state.66 The response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gundy v. United States (in which
the Court upheld SORNA) revealed fascinating fault lines,67 as many critics of U.S. carceral policies
decried the draconian law,68 while other liberals and progressives framed the decision as an important
victory for the administrative state.69
Or, to use one final familiar example, consider discussions of police expertise. Here, the dynamic
is slightly different: i.e., we aren’t dealing with an actual administrative agency. Nevertheless, a large
body of scholarship critiques judges’ reliance on police expertise as a justification for permissive
Fourth Amendment rules and shoddy enforcement of civil rights law.70
So, what to make of this selective preference for deference among many left-leaning critics of the
carceral state? The easy response to this inconsistency is that it is simply inconsistent – commentators
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and academics are driven by their political commitments, so any attempt to tease out intellectual
coherence is misguided.
Maybe that’s right. But, I think that answer misses another possibility, a possibility that should
raise major concerns for Barkow’s technocratic turn: expert-based solutions make sense when there’s
a generally agreed-upon regulatory purpose (e.g., making sure that consumers aren’t poisoned by
adulterated drugs or that factories aren’t spewing out large quantities of toxic gas); the technocratic
turn is a worse fit when it’s not clear what values or metrics the regulators should be quantifying.
(And, particularly, when there’s not agreement that the regulatory purpose is a worthy one.) “When
agencies have multiple goals and they come into conflict,” Barkow explains, “they adhere to their
primary mission.”71 Yet that primary mission here remains elusive.
If everyone agreed that the goal of the criminal system were maximizing “public safety” or
“reducing recidivism” (for example), then it might make sense to turn to technocrats who might use
their expertise to maximize these values. Similarly, if there were a general consensus on the purpose
of prisons, maybe it would make sense to allow wardens greater deference in determining how to
maximize rehabilitation, fitting moral punishment, or some other value. But, as decades of criminal
scholarship and policymaking have shown, there is no such first-principles agreement.72 The
retributivist and the expressivist, the victims’ rights advocate and the deterrence proponent might all
have very different goals and very different visions of what criminal law and its practitioners should
accomplish.
The Administrative Procedure Act, Chevron deference, and the structures of administrative law rest
on some belief that experts charged with a legislative mandate can use their expertise to advance that
statutory goal. If the goal is unclear, then what exactly are experts doing? And, what’s the justification
for deferring to their judgments and insulating their decisionmaking from democratic accountability?
Maybe this critique could (or should) cut more broadly. Maybe, taken seriously, this critique cuts
to the core of the administrative state and helps explain the deeply politicized nature of regulatory
agencies and the major swings in policy from administration to administration. That’s a bigger
discussion for another day. But, for the time being, it’s worth recognizing the deeply contested
framework of and justifications for criminal punishment. Whether other spaces of governance are
more easily suited to expert oversight or not, the fraught discourse on criminal punishment reveals
that there is no overarching agreement on what exactly criminal law is supposed to do.
Relatedly, the growing strand in scholarship and advocacy that questions the basic foundations of
criminal law and punishment makes any appeal to expertise a difficult fit. If one believes that the
problem of mass incarceration is one of scale or right-sizing (as Barkow’s account suggests), then it
certainly would make sense to figure out how to get it right – i.e., to determine who should be
incarcerated, for what, and for how long. Of course, such questions rest on generally agreed-upon
views of the purposes of punishment, but, assuming that we as a society could agree, there would be
discrete problems for the experts to solve.
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If one embraces abolitionist or similarly totalizing critiques of the carceral state, though, what
exactly is the appeal of expert-driven solutions? If one believes that the system isn’t broken and
actually is working as it’s supposed to (i.e., as a vehicle of social control targeted at marginalized
populations), then the problem with the status quo is hardly its irrationality. Maybe it adds insult to
injury that – as Barkow argues compellingly – so many policies don’t even advance public safety.
Marginalized populations are suffering, and public safety hasn’t even increased in exchange for that
harm done. But, if the starting point of critique is one rooted in a radical or transformative vision that
rejects the institutions of prison and police, then offering new management strategies rooted in
rationality and expertise would provide cold comfort.
By way of analogy, consider the case of capital punishment. There certainly are many objections
to how the state goes about killing people on death row. Decades of Eighth Amendment litigation
by death penalty opponents have challenged every aspect of the process, and doctors and
pharmaceutical companies have increasingly shied away from executions altogether, leaving some
states to adopt haphazard drug cocktails and methods of killing individuals on death row.73 Enhancing
expert oversight certainly might eliminate some of the horror stories of defendants writhing in agony
or taking hours to die. But, for death penalty abolitionists who believe that executions are inherently
illegitimate and inhumane (as Carol and Jordan Steiker have argued), “more humane” death isn’t really
the goal.74
Indeed, perhaps it’s this insight more than any other that helps explain the hostility to discretion
and administrative deference in the prison context: if one simply believes that prisons are cruel and
inhumane places, constructing a better science of prisons or appointing a new warden won’t do the
trick. Perhaps these are acceptable incremental improvements (or perhaps not), but they don’t actually
get at the fundamental problems of incarceration itself.
In short, agreeing on expert solutions requires agreeing on what’s actually wrong with the carceral
state. To be clear, I think that many different commentators and advocates could agree on some basic
problems that experts could address. And, Barkow’s approach might be an important first step in
addressing some of those less controversial issues (e.g., prison rape, harsh punishment for certain types
of non-violent offenses, etc.). But the harder questions – the ones that so often have led to punitive
popular policy-making (e.g., what to do about violence, sex crimes, etc.) – might remain unanswered.
Or, they might result in answers that would be highly unsatisfactory to many critics of the carceral
state.
B) What Is Criminal Justice Expertise?
Even if we agree with Barkow that experts can solve the myriad problems with the administration
of criminal law, another question remains: who are the appropriate experts? In some sense, this
question can’t be divorced from the previous question – the experts on the proper retributive scope
of punishment might be very different from the expert on recidivism, or deterrence, or what have you.
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(As Barkow acknowledges, the strength of her proposal may depend significantly on the underlying
purposes of criminal law.)75 More pressingly, though, this question speaks to contemporary debates
about public participation in the criminal system as well as to democratic- or political-economy-basedconcerns about the nature of expertise.
The criminal system – like the legal system generally – is dominated by elites who purport to
exercise some degree of expertise. Judges, police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers,
wardens, and others exert control over individual defendants and the outcomes of individual cases.
Case law and statutes reinforce and embrace the turn to these experts. But, recent critical scholarship
asks why these experts are owed deference and why their expertise deserves legitimacy or greater
attention.76 For example, viewed through such a critical lens, perhaps the statements of someone
previously incarcerated or someone who has been stopped repeatedly by police should be afforded
greater weight – she, too, has extensive experience with criminal law, so why shouldn’t her “expertise”
receive the same recognition?77 And, coming from a different political vantage point, why isn’t the
crime victim treated as an expert whose views and opinions are deserving of judicial and/or legislative
deference? In other words, viewed through the right frame, perhaps the victims’ rights movement
actually represents a turn to expertise.
This observation needn’t undermine Barkow’s arguments. While she does note that “prosecutors
often lack the necessary expertise to know what does and does not work across a range of criminal
justice options,”78 I don’t necessarily read Barkow as embracing a technocratic turn that rests on a
specific vision of (or set of qualifications for) criminal justice expertise. Rather, I think Barkow’s
argument could be read as a claim that we should be transparent about our goals and advance policies
rationally designed to address those goals, which strikes me as an important intervention in any policy
debate.79 If the goal is public safety, for example, Barkow contends that the right experts are
“criminologists or social scientists” who are steeped in “broader data” and “empirical analysis.”80
That said, such a slippery concept of “expertise” would appear to complicate, and perhaps
undermine, the cold, neutral, apolitical vision of expert-driven policymaking. Indeed, a conception of
expertise that would allow for treating crime victims as experts seems as though it would reify the sort
of populism that Barkow decries. (To be clear, I also think that re-framing victims’ rights advocacy
as expertise would be bad news, but I think it’s a theoretically defensible framing that highlights the
contingency of any appeal to expertise.) Deciding who gets to claim expertise and who is an expert
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necessarily would affect policy outcomes. And, rejecting some claims of expertise as too political, too
personal, or too divorced from a more easily quantifiable expert model necessarily has a political
valence. Further, while Barkow stresses that “[a]ny agency responsible for criminal justice policy
requires a diverse membership that reflects all of the relevant interests in the given area,” the question
of which voices to privilege remains.81 So, to the extent that one of data- or expert-driven
policymaking’s greatest strengths is its ostensible neutrality or insulation from politics, I remain
skeptical.
C) Can We Really Divorce Technocratic Approaches from Politics?
All of which leads to the biggest question that lurks beneath any technocratic approach: is it fair
to frame expertise or technocracy as distinct from politics or populism? Barkow’s account, not unlike
Stuntz’s, focuses on a pathology of U.S. politics, a “punitive populism” that has driven the carceral
state. To be clear, I don’t disagree that the story of mass incarceration is a story of political economy
and public opinion. Further, any discussion of U.S. criminal policymaking needs to reckon with deep
cultural forces – narratives of racialized fear of crime, understandings of “accountability” and
“incarceration” as interchangeable, etc. But, I remain unconvinced that turning to some set of elite
actors would necessarily avoid the biases, fears, and political whims of more democratic approaches
(or, that elite actors are necessarily less susceptible to those fears, biases, and whims).
Any expert-based institution (be it an agency, a commission, or some other group of elite actors)
can’t truly be insulated from politics or political forces. For example, take the federal judiciary.
Certainly, a federal judge won’t lose her seat due to a recall election because of a lenient sentence,
while an elected judge might. Nevertheless, the entire appointment process is deeply embedded in
electoral politics. The move by presidential candidates to announce potential Supreme Court
appointees indicates that the appointment process may only operate as a fig leaf to cover overtly
political decisions about which elite actors should be entitled to make “expert” decisions. Similarly,
administrative agencies, are generally recognized as deeply politicized institutions, despite their elite,
expert status. That is, no one would assume that a Republican Environmental Protection Agency or
National Labor Relations Board and a Democratic one would behave similarly.
This observation certainly isn’t lost on Barkow. Indeed, Barkow’s insight into these dynamics is
part of what makes the book (and her scholarship generally) such an important contribution to the
literature on criminal law and its administration. In the closing chapter of the book, Barkow actually
notes this dynamic in critiquing the U.S. Sentencing Commission. The problem with the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Commission, Barkow argues, is not a fundamental flaw with
technocracy and its failure to address the background conditions against which it operates (the
problem of “bias in, bias out,” as Sandy Mayson describes it).82 Rather, the Commission – like many
parole boards and analogous criminal justice experts – has been insufficiently shielded from politics
and the passions that define punitive populism.
If the problem were merely one of insulation from obvious conflict or corruption (of the sort that
become the province of judicial ethics and recusal inquiries), then I would be much more sanguine
about the possibility of remedying technocracy’s flaws. In fact, much of the appeal of these expert81
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based solutions is their ostensible distance from the criminal system’s current reliance on institutions
that (to many) already suggest such conflict of interest: an elected prosecutoriate and an elected
judiciary comprised largely of former prosecutors. Yet, I believe that such a conclusion allows for too
convenient a dismissal of the deeper political problems that underpin Barkow’s account of punitive
populism. Sure, there are awful cases of judges explicitly conspiring with DAs, but what about the
judge who firmly believes that she is upholding her oath, but who actually brings deep biases about
criminal defendants with her to the bench?
Elite institutional actors – not just voters, demagogues, or punitive populists – have been key
players in the rise of the carceral state.83 And, indeed, this point is one that Barkow makes compellingly
in describing the role of prosecutors and judges as drivers of mass incarceration.84 From federal
prosecutors, to sentencing commissions, to appointed judges, the punitive impulse and the embrace
of the “new penology” have transcended a story of interest groups or populism. It was, after all,
professors, not a mayor or elected DA who came up with broken windows policing.85 Put differently,
there is something about the ideology, assumptions, or politics (in a broader, non-electoral sense) of
these actors that has allowed them to advance similar ends as their elected counterparts. 86 Whether
this similarity in approach is understood in terms of race and class, of punitive impulses, or shared
understandings of the role and legitimacy of criminal law, I think it’s important to recognize that
experts have hardly been immune from the cultures of punitivism that Barkow describes.
Conclusion
Ultimately, my three questions aren’t meant to diminish the significance of Prisoners of Politics or
the magnitude of Barkow’s contribution to the study of criminal law and policy. Regardless of whether
one falls in the democratizers’ camp and remains wary of bureaucratic solutions, or one shares
Barkow’s affinity for administrative solutions, the reality is that any way forward in dismantling the
carceral state must reckon with the deep-seated punitive impulses that helped build it. By teasing out
those impulses and showing how they have spawned draconian policies, Barkow does a tremendous
service. Similarly, by highlighting the mismatch between the policy justifications of criminal law and
its actual results, Barkow reminds us to keep focused on results amid a sea of rhetoric.
Yet, if ours really is a culture awash in punitive populism, is the problem populism or punitivism?87
Barkow is careful to note that “there are limits to what the expertise model can accomplish” and that
addressing the U.S. addiction to punishment “would require cultural shifts beyond the scope of an
institutional fix.”88 I agree wholeheartedly. And, I also agree with Barkow that incremental
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institutional fixes she proposes could do much to improve the lives of people affected by the system.
But that doesn’t stop me from worrying about the costs of de-democratization and the ostensible
neutrality of expertise. It might be reassuring to imagine that the way to end mass incarceration is to
take away the angry mob’s pitchforks so that cooler heads may prevail. Yet, if decarceration is the
end goal, the cooler heads (presumably those of us who study criminal law and other elite actors within
the system) need to reckon with the reality that we actually are a part of the mob and that the pitchforks
hidden deep in our own closets might just be waiting for the right defendant, the right case, or the
right class of crimes. Maybe we’ll take out the pitchforks less often than the non-experts. But, when
we do, our own punitivism may all too easily be cloaked in the language of our own expertise. We
would bring more legitimacy. I don’t know if we would bring more justice.

